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Failure To Act 
The Political Battle Over Climate Change and the Prospects for Effective Global Policy 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, chief editor of Science, Donald Kennedy, wrote, "by now the scientific consensus on 
) 
global warming is so strong that it leaves little room for defensive assertions .... Consensus as 
strong as the one that has developed around this topic is rare in science" (Kennedy 2001,5513). 
The level of certainty within the scientific community is astounding, and climate change1 is now 
recognized among scientists as "one of the most serious challenges facing us today" (Union of 
Concerned Scientists, 2009). 
Despite the unified scientific consensus2, climate change has evolved into a heated political 
battle that presents a new and precarious problem for the international community. On one hand, 
dominant global players such as the European Union (ED) have seemingly placed climate change 
at the top of the political agenda, with ED President Nicolas Sarkozy exclaiming, "you carmot 
want to have the rights of great economic powers ... and abstain from your responsibilities. 
Fairness demands that all participate in the common effort, even if the developed countries must 
o 
accept more stringent constraints than the developing countries" (France Warns Climate Change 
Triggers Global Conflict 2009). However, despite some legislative success and soaring rhetoric, 
the ED continues to struggle with overly ambitious goals, unclear legal framework for oversight 
and regulation, and strong opposition from some member states and their key industries. On the 
1 Although climate change and global warming are often used interchangeably, this paper emphasizes the important 
technical differences between the two terms. Climate change refers specifically to a change of climate, which is linked, directly 
or indirectly, to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere over a period oftime (UNFCCC 1994). Climate 
change is a more appropriate term because it encapsulates the systemic changes in weather that will vary from region to region 
and emphasizes more than elevated global temperatures. This must remain conceptually distinct from the natural global warming 
process in which infrared radiation is absorbed by the atmosphere and maintains a habitable temperature on Earth (IPcc2007, 
875). 
2 Scientific consensus refers to agreeing studies that have utilized traditional scientific channels (e.g. peer-reviewed papers 
and journal articles) to conduct research and formulate conclusions (McCright and Dunlap 2003, 359). 
other hand, the United States (us) has continued to delay action on climate change, citing 
economic and sovereignty concerns, and declaring it best to "have the full [scientific] accounting 
and full understanding of what's taking place" before acting (George w. Bush, Presidential 
Debate 2000). 
The struggle to cultivate effective global policy has been so contentious because climate 
change touches on a wide range of political, social, philosophical, and economic issues. Thus, in 
order to discuss the prospects for global climate change policy, it is necessary to illuminate the 
cozy yet complex relationship between power, politics, and interests, and understand the roles 
that all three play in the broader policymaking process. Assessing the successes and setbacks of 
policy initiatives requires a rigorous policy model that will not only illuminate the power 
relationships that exist within policymaking, but will also account for the messy, convoluted way 
in which legislation is created. This theoretical model will help elucidate why two ofthe world's 
most dominant global players have pursued such different climate change policies and how 
various interests have impacted and influenced regulatory decisions more than others. 
Understanding the role that power and interests have played in ED and us policy decisions will 
help illuminate the prospects for effective and collective global climate change policy and assist 
in deciphering between a mere pledge for action and a nation-state' s ability to initiate change. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
How Policy is Made 
In order to address the severity and imminence of climate change, industrialized countries 
will likely have to make significant changes in the way they operate and develop. Because of 
this, outside interests are especially concerned and involved in the legislative process, with both 
proponents and opponents seeking to influence policy decisions. John Kingdon presents a 
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policymaking model that captures both the internal and external competition among outside 
interests and political participants, as well as the malleable nature of policymaking. First, 
Kingdon distinguishes between non-visible and visible participants who play important roles in 
the legislative process. Non-visible participants and outside interests are understood as groups 
. ',-, 
who have a concern for the way policy is fashioned, but need to go to some lengths to gain the 
attention of important and visible government officials. These visible participants, such as the 
president and vice president, are easily recognized by the general public and have greater access. 
and input in the legislative process (Kingdon 2003,61). 
In his discussion of the broader poiicymaking process, Kingdon identifies three policy 
streams comprised of problems, policies, and politics, with each stream having important roles 
but different degrees of influence (20Q3, 19). The first stream, known as the problem recognition 
stage, includes groups of governmental and nongovernmental actors who seek to define certain 
issues as problems and alert the public about these pending problems (Kingdon 2003, 90). At this· 
initial stage, there exists an important conceptual difference between an "issue," which broadly· 
refers to conditions or situations, neither of which are necessarily negative (Kingdon 2003, 109), 
and a "problem." Labeling an issue as a problem implies that an issue has successfully 
commanded public attention, has been accepted by the public as a household term (Ungar 1992, 
489), and, most importantly, is serious enough to make people want to act (Kingdon 2003, 109). 
As an issue comes to be defined as a problem and grows more. salient, specialists will try and 
act on the problem through bill introductions, speeches, testimonies, papers, and discourse 
(Kingdon 2003, 19). In this policy recognition stream, non-visible participants such as academic 
specialists, career bureaucrats and lobbyists seek to influence visible participants such as the 
President and Congress by proposing policy solutions and shaping the political agenda (Kingdon 
3 
2003, 199). This process leads to the third political stream known as political agenda setting. In 
order to ensure that their personal interests receive priority and attention from visible 
participants, outside interests and non-visible participants negotiate their way through the 
decision-making process and garner support for their interests (Kingdon 2003, 162). Every so 
often, these three streams converge to create a policy window, allowing new reformative 
legislation to move through the system that might otherwise have been rejected (Kingdon 2003, 
19). 
Kingdon's theory accounts for the different degrees of power and influence that are 
embedded in any political system, and his model mirrors the convoluted way in which policy is 
created. These are important factors that are often overlooked by other policy theories that tend 
to promote parsimony and rigidity over complexity and flexibility. Richard Hofferbert's theory 
of convergence is an example of an overly parsimonious analysis. Hofferbert analyzes 
policymaking in terms of converging social and political factors, such as historical events, 
socioeconomic conditions, mass political behavior, and elite behavior, which ultimately merge 
and form policy (Sabatier 1991, 150). Unlike Kingdon's theory, which highlights the internal 
competition among the three political streams and their participants, Hofferbert's theory fails to 
account for the complex way in which different actors and policymakers vie for political 
influence and agenda-setting power. 
Kingdon's model not only accounts for the dispersion of power within the political system 
and the array of participants that are involved policymaking process, but it encourages the use of 
broad analytical tools to understand how myriad forces shape political outcomes. This is 
especially important in climate change policy where various political, economic, and social 
forces compete to shape and influence political decisions. In this sense, many competing theories 
4 
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fall short yet again because of their failure to accept the role that temporary yet important 
decision makers play in any given issue. Rational choice theory is an example of an overly 
reductive approach to policy theory in its reliance on a single decision maker and its assumption 
that policy solutions are both obvious and limited in number. Rational choice theory declares that 
decision makers are faced with a series of consequences and alternatives, and will choose the one 
that generates the best result for attaining the desired outcome (Stone 2002, 234). By favoring an 
overly simplistic assessment of policymaking, rational choice theory glosses over the very 
elements that Kingdon's model highlights. Kindon's emphasis on the internal and external 
competition among participants provides a sound assessment of how policy is created, and 
provides a workable framework to move forward and'analyze the fole that power and influence 
. play within the policymaking process. 
How Policy is Shaped, Altered, and Influenced: A Discussion About Power 
Power and influence are ubiquitously associated with the policymaking process as interests 
compete to construe issues in a certain light andshape the political agenda. A discussion 
concerning the central role of power-in terms of access, in terms of structural and institutional 
preferences, in comparison to other individual and group interests, etc.-within the policymaking 
process will elqcidate how certain interests have gained a stronger foothold over others, and why 
particular ideas experience greater policy success. 
Robert Dahl's theory of shared power among groups proposes a very literal understanding of 
causal power (Dahl 1967, 24). Dahl's notion relies exclusively on observable and measurable 
qualities (1991, 33), including physical, persuasive, manipulative, and coercive (1991,' 40). 
Although many criticize Dahl's idea of power for being overly simplistic and narrow, it has great 
analytical application for understanding power and influence within politics and its spillover 
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effects into society. Essentially, the idea of causation-the power to get someone to do 
something you want, or to keep someone from doing something you don't want-plays an 
incredibly central role in the policymaking process, where interests constantly lobby in support 
or opposition of various issues. 
Causation has even greater implications when individuals and groups seek to limit the scope 
of knowledge and awareness of others. In Dahl's view, individuals and groups are "limited by 
their own awareness of their opportunities for exercising influence" (1991, 25). Thus, by exerting 
influence and controlling how others perceive (or fail to perceive) the opportunities in front of 
them, interested groups and individuals can get a leg up on others in the policymaking process. 
This has immediate ramifications for the public when individuals fail to realize the issues and 
debates within the political arena, and thus remain passive and, at times, complacent. 
James Manley accepts Dahl's notion of observable power and its causal nature, but argues 
that Dahl's theory overlooks the vast structural inequalities that inherently favor certain interests 
(Manley 1983,372). In his critique, Manley argues that Dahl's pluralism assumes that the public 
simply needs to act in order to fix the vast social and economic inequalities that arise under the 
American capitalist system (1983, 378). This overly simplistic assumption of how power 
dynamics operate in a capitalist system is a significant limitation to Dahl's power.theory but is 
also severely underdeveloped in Manley's critique. 
Bachrach and Baratz address this same point by introducing a more discrete form of power 
that confronts Manley and Dahl's reliance on causal power. The authors argue that power can be 
exercised "by confining the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those 
issues which are comparatively innocuous" (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 948), thereby alienating 
the public from issues that could potentially be detrimental to their preferences. However, 
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Bachrach and Baratz still rely on measurable forms of power that result in "actual, observable 
conflict" (Lukes 2005, 23). Steven Lukes argues that power operates very omnisciently and often 
unseen. He writes, "A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to 
do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants" . 
(2005,27). Lukes explains that "the supreme and most insidious exercise of power" rarely 
involves conflict or causality, and is instead the power to prevent people from "having 
grievances and shaping their perceptions .. .in such a way that they accept their role in the 
existing order ofthings" (2005, 28). 
Lukes' argument shares many similarities with Michel Foucault's discussion of structural 
and unverifiable power. Foucault concedes that power does include Dahl's notion of rigid and· 
observable conflict (Foucault 1977, 206) but, more importantly, power is often "omnipresent and 
omniscient" and "subdivides itself in a regular, uninterrupted way" (Foucault 1977, 197). 
Foucault's notion of structural, institutionalized power has important implications for the 
policymaking process where political decisions are inextricably linked with and influenced by 
economic and political conditions and financial interests. Thus, as issues circulate the policy 
streams and various interests seek to promote or dispel them, Foucault would argue that issues 
that are compatible with a capitalist-driven political economy receive structural preference even 
without the help of outside interests. This is especially important for climate change and . 
environmental issues, where the idea of governmental regulation and intervention clash with the 
prevailing free market ideology that inherently receives priority in the political system. 
How Problems Fluctuate and Attenuate 
Although theories of policymaking and power will be the guiding principles in the analysis of 
climate change policy, an important but peripheral theory involves understanding how issues 
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come to be defined as problems and how problems linger in the public arena. Anthony Downs 
presents the idea of an issue attention cycle in which news stories sequentially move through five 
stages of social awareness. This model depicts issues as first existing outside public attention 
then coalescing into a social crisis when a natural disaster generates social alarm. After a surge in 
public awareness, a gradual decline in public interest occurs, followed by feelings of boredom 
and discouragement when the public realizes the high costs and sacrifices necessary to make a 
substantial change. An issue eventually moves into a prolonged limbo with "spasmodic 
recurrences of interest," where public attention remains higher than before but is no longer a 
primary social problem (Downs 1972, 40). 
Hilgartner and Bosk identify many problems with this orderly succession, arguing that it 
overlooks relationships among problems and does not take into account the degree to which 
social problems are embedded within a "complex institutionalized system of problem 
formulation and dissemination" (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 55). Hilgartner and Bosk contend 
that social problems arise from competing public arenas, and it is within these arenas that social 
problems are "discussed, selected, defined, framed, dramatized, packaged, and presented to the 
public" (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 59). All arenas have a carrying capacity, such as column 
inches, minutes of air time, funding, etc. that limits the number of social problems that can be 
addressed at a single time (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 59). Individuals are also subject to 
carrying capacities and are often preoccupied with issues of "master status," which consist of 
day-to-day social conditions that pertain directly to them, including financial stability, 
employment and family. Once these master status problems have been addressed, there "may be 
very little surplus compassion left over for social issues with less personal significance" 
(Hilgartner and Bosk 1988,59). 
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Issues are also subject to principles of selection, such as the need for drama and novelty, the 
danger of saturation, cultural preoccupations, and political biases, which continue to whittle 
down the amount and types of issues that receive public attention (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 
61). This has important ramifications for a problem such as climate change, which requires 
___ constant, thematic,e£cplanative cQverage and does not have the same level of novelty and drama 
as other issues. More exciting issues often take priority, leaving the public less aware of the 
threats of climate change and less concerned about the policy debates and responses. 
LITERATURE REVIEW: CLIMATE CHANGE AS A SOCIAL PROBLEM 
Policy and Politics. 
On the surface, it appears that the us lags behind the EU considera:bly when it comes to 
precautionary environmental legislation and ambitious climate change policy. And, while the ED 
deserves credit for the strides it has made in environmental protection, the notion that the EU is a 
global frontrunner while the us remains a laggard state is a drastic oversimplification that 
overlooks the limitations that are embedded in both the EU and us 'approach to climate change. 
The difficulties that have, surfaced under the EU'S approach stem primarily from power struggles 
\ 
within a complex national and supranational political system, where coordination, 
implementation, authority, and oversight remain limited due to competing interests and 
authorities. The us on the other hand struggles both with the initial policymaking process as well . 
as power issues, where key stakeholders and participants continually seek to influence, and at 
times, undermine, the problems, policy, and politics streams and shape the political agenda.' 
Analyzing the players and processes involved in policymaking and highlighting the power 
relationships that exist within these processes will help explain both the successes and setbacks 
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of EU and us climate change policy, and will illuminate the subtle yet important issues that 
remain entrenched in this problem. 
Unlike the us, the EU has created a legal framework that recognizes the environment as a 
European concern and seeks to harmonize environmental health with economic growth (Vig and 
Axelrod 1999, 73). Initially these environmental standards were incidental and peripheral, 
developing from early trade agreements such as the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), 
the European Economic Community (1957), and the Treaty of Rome (1957) (Vig and Axelrod 
1999, 73). Although none of these treaties specifically mentioned environmental protection, they 
left room for the Environmental Council to restrict imports, exports, and production on the basis 
of human and environmental health (Hildebrand 2002, 16). 
The Paris Summit in 1972 marked the beginning of actual environmental policy in the 
European Community (EC) with a set of concrete measures for the next two years (Hildebrand 
2002, 18). This momentum persisted from 1972 to 1987 with the enactment offive 
Environmental Action Programmes (EAPS) that focused on achieving the Summit goals 
(Hildebrand 2002,20), and the passage of over 150 pieces of environmental laws (Grant, 
Matthews, and Newell 2000 10). Environmental legislative efforts reached its pinnacle in 1987 
when the Single European Act acknowledged that the environment was a common concern 
integral to the health and progress of Europe (Vig and Axelrod 1999, 74), and gave the 
environment a strong and formal legal basis (Hildebrand 2002, 20). This legal framework, 
coupled with several environmental disasters and problems such as Chernobyl and air and water 
quality issues, helped solidify public support and strengthened the concept of the environment as 
a collective social concern (Grant, Matthews, and Newell 2000, 9). 
10 
rJ 
Against this glowing legislative backdrop, it appears that the EU has the essential framework 
to aggressively pursue stringent environmental regulations. However, the policy successes of the 
1970s and 1980s were soon confronted with the reality of weak oversight, broad rhetoric, and 
varying levels of commitment among member states (Grant, Matthews, and Newell 2000, 10). 
This can be seen in the significant decrease in the number of proposed and implemented pieces 
of environmental laws since 1992 (Vig and Axelrod 1999, 84), as well the wavering commitment 
from the European Council (Grant, Matthews, and Newell 2000, 10). Additionally, between 
1975 and 1980, the Council, which was instructed by the Paris Summit to draft environmental 
goals and objectives, met only twice for environmental issues (Grant, Matthews, and Newell 
2000, 10). 
On an analytical level, the disconnect between legislation and implementation demonstrates 
the complex yet subtle power struggles that exist within the EU'S unclear and vague legal 
framework. These power struggles are especially apparent during times of economic crisis or 
hardship, where commitment to the environment immediately becomes secondary to economic 
stability. Using Mariley's notion of structural power, it is recognized that economic concerns and 
interests enjoy elevated levels of influence and prestige within developed political economies, 
and are thus more effective at shaping the political agenda (Grant, Matthews, and Newell 2000, 
46). This is exceptionally true during crises, as demonstrated during the economic shock of the 
1970s. Financial strains placed great pressure on policymakers to act swiftly and effectively, not· 
only giving industry and business interests an opportunity to influence policy, but also resulted in 
a considerable drop in the scale and pace of environmental legislation (Hildebrand 2002,21). 
. . 
Manley's idea of preferential, structural power applies to the another problem associated with 
ED climate change policy, where businesses have a clear and substantial influence on 
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environmental policymaking at the state level, and are then able to prevent action from occurring 
at the supranational level (Grant, Matthews, and Newell 2000, 46). Dahl's notion of causal 
power also comes into play, where local industries are able to promote their interests over ED 
interests, causing member states to pledge commitment to supranational environmental goals 
while protecting local economies and industries (Bailey 2007,437). This causal power is 
especially apparent under the European Union Emissions Trading System (ED ETS), where key 
local industries have aggressively lobbied their state governments to ensure that their businesses 
will not be overly burdened by pollution and emission laws. In response to industry pressure, 
states continue to safeguard local interests by over allocating pollution credits and failing to 
monitor and penalize non-compliance (Bailey 2007, 437). 
A third problem that has seriously hindered the ED'S success in policy implementation is the 
internal limitations of the ED political system. Although the Environmental Commission is a 
formally recognized branch of the European Commission, there is no clearly defined area of 
exclusive competence and no framework to implement, maintain, or oversee an effective 
mitigation program (Grant, Matthews and Newell 2000, 107). This, in turn, invites conflict 
between local, regional, national, and supranational interests when common policy goals must be 
reached. Similar to the issue of state interests over ED interests, this issue has also surfaced under 
the EU ETS when the Environmental Commission sought to exercise its power by rejecting 
member states' National Allocation Plans (NAPS) during the first and second phases of the ED 
ETS. In response to the Commission's exertion of authority, states fought back and filed 
complaints with the European Commission arguing that the Environmental Commission has no 
legal basis to reject state NAPS (Bailey 2007,438). This internal battle has continued to stall the 
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EU'S progress towards its domestic and international climate goals, and remains a significant 
hurdle for future regulation. 
The three main problems of durability amid economic troubles, state interests versus ED 
interests, and internal failures illuminate the significant power struggles that create a great 
disconnect between what EU seeks to accomplish and what it can actually do. As Grant et al. 
explains, "there is evident tension t4at will have to be confronted between the rhetoric of the EU, 
which still makes it the most progressive Annex I negotiating bloc, and the internal failure to 
find policies to meet the international leadership commitment" (2000, 108). As the ED grapples 
with these competing interests and seeks to reconcile what it can, another maj or player in 
international climate change efforts has opted to sit out altogether while the rest of the developed 
world addresses this global problem. 
Although the us has emerged as a laggard country in domestic and international 
environmental efforts, this was not always the case. From the early 1960s to the mid 1980s, the 
us led the way in terms of stringent and precautionary measures and most European states lagged 
behind considerably. These included strict amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(1962), the Endangered Species Act (1966), stringent vehicle emission standards (early 1970's), 
a ban on DDT (1971), the American Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), the prohibition of CFCS 
in aerosol propellants (1977), and a partial ban,on food additives under the Delaney Clause of the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (1985) (Vogel 2003, 559-566). This momentum began to 
dissipate in the late 1980s and 1990s, however, with a political and ideological shift away from 
environmental protection and a turn towards pro-industry, anti-regulation philosophies. 
McCright and Dunlap argue that this shift in political support provided an avenue for visible 
and non-visible participants to organize and mobilize against the environmental movement and 
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undermine the policy steps that were leaning in support environmental regulation (2003, 360). 
They explain that the 1994 Republican takeover in Congress allowed conservatives who were 
sympathetic to industry and free market capitalism to promote the anti-climate change campaign 
inside Washington (McCright and Dunlap 2003,360). Sheldon Ungar points to an important 
preceding event that primed these skeptic efforts. Ungar argues that after peak public attention 
towards the environment following the record high temperatures in the summer of 1988, the 
American public largely "eradicated the lingering memory of the hot summer" and removed 
environmental health from their primary concern (1992, 494). This touches on Hilgartner and 
Bosks' notion of a master status issue where concern for climate change and the enviromnent 
diminished as the physical and immediate effects faded. This decline in public attention allowed 
politicians to shove environmental issues to the margins of the political agenda and enabled 
climate skeptics to initiate a concerted backlash against environmental policy efforts (Ungar 
1992,494). 
McCright and Dunlap empirically demonstrate how skeptic interests penetrated the three 
policy streams by documenting a precipitous increase in skeptic publishing capacities, television 
and radio advertisements, policy forums, congressional hearings, and ad hoc projects (2003, 
356). Between 1990 and 1997 conservative think tanks circulated 224 documents on global 
warming, sponsored policy forums, public speeches and press conferences, and perhaps most 
notably, delivered testimony at eight major Congressional hearings on climate change (McCright 
and Dunlap 2003, 356-358). Oklahoma Republican Senator James Inhofe epitomized the cozy 
ties between skeptics and prominent members of Congress when he took the Senate floor in 2003 
and, with no scientific training or background, concluded that climate change is "the greatest 
hoax ever perpetrated on the American people" (lnhofe 2003). 
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On one level, these tactics embody Dahl notion of causal power, where politicians and 
outside interests were able to influence the policy streams, successfully frame climate change as 
a non-problem, and shape political decisions. First, the increase in skeptic projects between 1990 
and 1997 demonstrates a measurable shift of influence within the political system. Additionally, 
there is an undeniable link between skeptic presence in the media, which peaked in 1995 and 
1996 (McCright and Dunlap 2003,365), and the fervent political opposition towards Kyoto that 
surfaced in 1996 and 1997. 
On another level, the rise in skeptic presence also touch on Manley's discussion of structural 
power. Skeptic influence throughout the 1990s coincided with a decline in the presence of elite 
scientists-or scientists who utilize traditional scientific methods and undergo the peer revision 
process (McCright and Dunlap 2003, 364). Because of the opportunity presented by the 1994 
Republican takeover of Congress, the political climate was very receptive to the.skeptics' agenda 
and aided in the dissemination of their claims (McCright and Dunlap 2003,364). The structural 
power that facilitated skeptics' efforts had the opposite effect on scientific and environmental 
claims and successfully pushed their goals to the periphery of the political agenda. 
Bachrach and Baratz and Lukes' ideas oflimiting the scope of awareness also come into 
play, where outside interests controlled how climate change was presented to the public, thereby 
inconspicuously shaping the public's perception and concern. White House insider Frank Luntz 
pioneered the art and execution of these tactics by manufacturing an aura of uncertainty around 
the issue of climate change. As demonstrated in his 2003 memo entitled "Winning the Global 
Warming Debate," Luntz wrote, "the scientific debate is closing (against us) but is not yet 
closed. There is a window of opportunity to challenge the science .... Most Americans want more 
information .. .it is our job to provide that information" (Luntz 2003). By deliberately but 
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discreetly confusing the public and skewing scientific findings, skeptics embodied the form of 
power that Lukes calls the "supreme and most insidious" (2005, 28). Skeptics were able to shape 
public perceptions about climate change in such a way as to get the public and the media to 
"accept their role in the existing order of things" without the their knowing (Lukes 2005,28). 
Media and Discourse 
Climate skeptics also found a powerful ally in the us media, which was instrumental in 
translating and disseminating skeptic claims and shaping public perception (Boykoff and Rajan, 
207). Robert McChesney argues that the us media has evolved into a capitalist-driven business, 
and has subsequently given rise to a string of macro-level journalistic codes that essentially 
determine which stories become news (McChesney 2004, 88). W. Lance Bennett explains that 
these norms not only affect what is deemed news, but also how the news is presented (1996, 
375). Furthermore, Andrew Kohut points out that certain stories are avoided if they are too 
complex, long, or boring, if the editor or publisher disagrees, or if they run counter to the desires 
ofthe corporation (2000,43). 
These external, macro-level limitations have given rise to internal, micro-level norms 
within journalism. Personalization, dramatization, and novelty are used to select topics that will 
capture public attention (Boykoff and Roberts 2007, 12) and stories that focus on the competition 
between personalities, provide entertainment, or have a new angle will often be selected over 
issues that require extensive investigation or thematic analysis (Boykoff and Roberts 2007, 12). 
Furthermore, stories that could potentially saturate the public with redundant claims will most 
likely be avoided (Ungar 1988, 71). Once topics have been selected, journalists will often rely on 
the viewpoints of officials or authorities when presenting news, and will report competing 
opinions equally in order to present objective coverage (Bennett 1996,375). 
16 
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Media asa capitalist-driven business has compounded these jo~alistic norms and provided 
ample opportunity for the same power tactics that are used within the policymaking process to 
also be employed within society. Because skeptics successfully dramatized and politicized 
climate change by introducing "competing" viewpoints and latching on to prominent politicians, 
the' media failed to provide constant, accurate coverage of climate change. These principles of 
selection and power tactics helped create an illusion that climate change was an unresolved 
political issue rather than a widely accepted social and scientific problem. With the shift in 
political climate, a sympathetic Congress, and a capitalist-driven media, climate change skeptics 
were able to "achieve approximate parity with some of the most renowned experts in the field" 
(McCright and Dunlap 2003, 366). This shift has proven detrimental to domestic and 
international efforts to combat climate change and has had a significant impact on the us' 
standing in the global arena. 
METHODOLOGY. 
As demonstrated in the literature review, climate change issues are closely linked to a range 
of interests-everything from scientists to the media to industries to policymakers. In order to 
understand how and to what degree these different interests have shaped policy decisions in the 
EU and us and to determine how different levels of influence and power operate within the 
policymaking process, it is necessary to analyze the historical, social, political, and economic 
issues that are embedded in climate change. Designing a case study that compares the EU and us 
along all of these lines serves as the best tool to "illuminate a decision or a set of decisions" that 
have led to different climate change agendas in the EU and us (Yin 1994, 12). Additionally, 
utilizing the two-case study research method provides the opportunity to understand how 
different problems, interests, and influences interact in political systems, as well as identify how 
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various social and political philosophies have subtly guided policy decisions. Many of these 
important issues could potentially be overlooked using only a single-case study, thereby 
providing limited analysis and incomplete conclusions. 
In designing the two case-study project, there are many countries that could be compared to 
the us. However, the EU was selected because of its preditabl[e] different[ces]" with the us, 
which is an important feature in the two-case study design (Yin 1993, 5). As a collective, the EU-
27 is a dominant global player and is comparable to the us in terms of Gross National Product 
(GNP) (Workman 2007), oil consumption, and GHG emissions (Vogler 2005,837). Unlike the us, 
however, the Eu-27 is also a leader in domestic and global environmental regulation (Vogler 
2005,838). The EU'S international competitiveness and ambitious climate change agenda serves 
as an effective comparative model to not only analyze the different climate change agendas but 
to also understand the limitations, failures, and prospects of both the EU and us' approaches. 
The two case study method provides the necessary comparative tools to understand how and 
why the EU and us pursued different climate change agendas, but it is also necessary to clarify 
why the explanatory two-case study method is preferable to an exploratory or descriptive case 
study. Because of the inextricable link between policy decisions, economic priorities, and social 
philosophies, it is necessary to trace the "operational links" that exist between these factors (Yin 
1994,6) and identify their connections to current legislative debates and decisions. Drawing the 
link between historical developments and current issues is a trademark of an explanatory case 
study and provides a broad and flexible framework for understanding the EU and us' 
justifications for their respective climate change agendas. This is preferable to exploratory case 
studies, which focus on the "feasibility of desired research procedures," and subsequently 
overlook important historical events, social developments, and political decisions (Yin 1993, 5). 
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it is also favorable to descriptive case studies, which only "describe phenomenon within its 
contexts" and fail to account for broader background analysis or future implications (Yin 1993, 
5). 
Critics of the case-study method argue that the case study method limits prospects for greater 
scientific generalizations, requires extensive time commitments, and is prone to selection bias 
(George and Bennett 2005, 23). While these criticisms have merit, they represent one side in the 
game oftracie-offs. First, the purpose of a case study is not, as statisticians prefer, to characterize 
a specific population. Instead, it seeks to generalize about theories, concepts, and relationships, 
subsequently promoting richness over parsimony (George and Bennett 2005, 22). Additionally, 
although selection bias can be problematic, it can actually be an asset in a case study by 
promoting a stronger research design. By analyzing cases that address particular concerns and 
share similar outcomes, the case study method provides a focused analysis and highlights a range 
of important variables (George and Bennett 2005, 23). Given the complex and multifaceted 
nature of the research question, the explanatory two-case study method will be an essential tool 
to explore the role that power, politics, and interests play in EU and us policy decisions. While 
such a method inevitably entails extensive and diverse research, the need for a "high degree of 
explanatory richness" (George and Bennett 2005,34) vastly outweighs the benefits of broad 
generalizations or overly focused conclusions. 
CASE STUDY: EXPLAINING EU AND US DIVERGENCE 
At the onset of Kyoto negotiations, the us, the ,EU, and other participating countries faced 
considerable uncertainty in regards to a global emissions trading program. Never before had an 
international coalition sought to create a market for pollution and work collectively to mitigate 
climate change (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007,26). Moreover, the EU and the us faced the 
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possibility of significant economic ramifications given both the magnitude of their respective 
economies as well as their significant contribution to global GHG emissions (Schreurs and 
Tiberghien 2007,26). Despite the high level of economic risk embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, 
the EU and 183 other countries signed and ratified the agreement (UNFCC 2009), creating an 
unprecedented global policy window in which the problems, policy, and politics streams came 
together to address the short-term and long-term threats of climate change. It now remains to be 
determined why the EU not only pursued Kyoto, but implemented even more stringent domestic 
regulations, while the us opted out entirely. 
Analyzing four important factors--worldviews, political institutions, economic interests, and 
public opinion and the media-will help illuminate the subtle but important differences that 
guided EU and us policy decisions. While no one factor can account for the policy divergence, 
each offers important explanatory insight that can be used to collectively explain the different 
policy approaches. 
Worldviews 
The most appropriate place to begin is by examining the fundamental social, political, and 
philosophical differences between the EU and us. Although broad and intangible, these 
worldviews can be thought of as the normative ideas and fundamental differences between 
nations, states, and nation-states that subconsciously guide decision-making processes (Schreurs 
and Tiberghien 2007,26). Understanding the differences in worldviews can help expound 
prevailing social, political, and economic philosophies, illuminate the role these philosophies 
play in the policymaking process, and explain why certain countries are more receptive to 
various ideas more than others. 
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Heightened concern for the environment in the ED can be partially attributed to Europeans' 
personal experience with severe levels of pollution (Grant, Matthews, and Duncan 2000, 8). 
Extreme levels of waste and poor air and water quality posed a direct threat to human health in 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and Europeans continue to retain a sense of living memory 
associated with the dangers of a polluted environment. This lends important public support for 
the environment and helps construe it as a common political and social concern (Grant, 
Matthews, and Duncan 2000, 8). Additionally, as an integrated, supranational political entity, the 
ED is more accepting cifinternational institutions and multilateral coalitions such as Kyoto 
(Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007,26). 
The ED has also adopted the Precautionary Principle as both a general and compulsory 
principle of ED law and environmental policy. The Precautionary Principle, which was formally 
signed into law under the Maastricht Treaty, states "parties should take measures to protect 
public health and the environment, even in the absence of clear, scientific evidence of harm" 
(Raffensperger and Tickner 1999, xxiii). This principle, which is premised on preventative action 
and rectifying environmental damage at the source, requires a higher level of governmerital 
oversight and regulation, and presents a drastically different philosophy than what is traditionally 
accepted in the DS. 
Unlike the ED, the us has not accepted the environment as a common political~ social, and 
economic concern. While both Europe and the DS share a history of environmental disasters and . 
threatening levels of pollution, Americans tend to view such events as geographically isolated 
and fail to retain a sense of living memory. Additionally, environmental regulation clashes with 
the prevailing free-market ideology that emphasizes individual competition, limited government 
intervention, and sustained economic growth (Brewer 2003, 154). Internationally, the Dsviews 
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multilateral institutions as a threat to state sovereignty, and perceives coalitions such as Kyoto as 
a hindrance to economic growth and an impediment on the free market (McCright and Dunlap 
2003,353). These worldviews have helped guide decisions Hke Kyoto, where state sovereignty 
and economic prosperity were pitted against, and ultimately prioritized over, collective 
obligations and international consensus. 
Taken together, the difference in worldviews serves as a strong explanatory factor for the 
different levels of environmental concern and divergence in climate change policies. The EU'S 
personal experience with pollution, combined with an acceptance of governmental regulation, 
the Precautionary Principle, and international coalitions, makes the EU more receptive to 
international and domestic efforts to reduce emissions (Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007,26). In the 
us, the emphasis on sustained economic growth has been an underlying reason for the us' 
reluctance to accept climate change as a serious problem. Additionally, skepticism of 
international treaties has served to frame efforts such as Kyoto as a threat to the American way 
oflife rather than as a prospect for long-term well-being (McCright and Dunlap 2003, 393). 
Political Institutions 
The political systems in the EU and the us both embody the pluralist theory of shared, 
diffused power among groups and political branches. Although both institutional designs seek to 
disperse the decision-making power among governmental bodies and include outside interests, 
there is an inherent and irrefutable limit to this inclusive system when power and influence come 
into play. Power relationships among groups and policymakers are especially prevalent in the 
environmental arena where the political economy naturally tends to work against regulatory 
ideas. Power and influence have been key factors in both undermining environmental efforts and 
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pushing for regulatory legislation to remain on the political agenda, and continue to be a central 
part of both the EU and us policymaking processes. 
In theory, the EU'S institutional system is designed to balance state and supranational 
interests, providing the opportunity for policymakers and participants to interact and move 
within and between the two governments. However, much of the actual decision-making power 
is concentrated in the hands of the Council of Ministers, which is made up of democratically 
elected representatives from each member state (Vig and Axelrod 1999, 75). Unlike the 
European Commission, which primarily proposes legislation, and the European Parliament, 
which participates in the decision-making process, the Ministers have the power to commit their 
state governments to new EU policies (Vig and Axelrod 1999, 76). The Council's comparatively 
more powerful and central role in implementing and monitoring policy has proven problematic at 
times due to its tendency to favor national politics while the Commission and Parliament are 
more strongly linked with supranational goals (Vig and Axelrod 1999, 77). 
This lack of cohesion is especially apparent in environmental legislation because of the 
different levels of capacity, commitment, and concern among member states. For example, . 
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands have been the strongest supporters of ambitious climate 
change goals while Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have remained reluctant to carry out EU 
policies (Vig and Axelrod 1999, 77). Additionally, due to the lack of a strong, recognizable 
authority and the continual battle between states and the Environmental Commission, it has 
proven difficult to ensure that Council members enforce EU environmental goals (Bailey 2007, 
438). 
The us also has a highly diffused system of power in its pluralistic model, and, like the EU, it 
requires cooperation across several branches of government (Vogler 2005, 837). Similar to the 
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EU, the us struggles with Congress's binary obligation to both the federal government and local 
constituents, which has served to limit avenues for cooperation and has greatly favored the use of 
veto power (Harrison 2007,97). Generally speaking, when legislation receives negative 
constituent feedback, policymakers are more inclined to side with the voter base and work 
against Congress and the Executive branch. Such was the case with climate change during the 
Clinton years. While Clinton personally supported Kyoto, Congress's dual interests essentially 
pitted the Senate, their constituents, and their key industries against the Executive's agenda, and, 
with the passage of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, virtually eliminated any hope for us participation 
(Harrison 2007, 97). 
One aspect of the EU'S political system that has aided environmental efforts is the role and 
nature of political parties. Although the EU, as a supranational entity, differs from traditional 
parliamentary systems, its structure still provides the opportunity for numerous political parties 
(Dahl 2002, 56), which fosters coalitions within government and provides greater minority 
representation (Dahl 2002, 61). Broader representation has been especially beneficial for 
member states looking to push environmental interests. Strong concern for the environment in 
Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway has given rise to the Green 
Party at both the state level and EU (Vogel 2001, 557), giving the environment a crucial political 
ally. The us, however, relies on a "first-past-the-post" electoral system, which strongly favors 
the two major parties and greatly diminishes the opportunity for third parties (Dahl 2002, 61). 
Unlike the EU'S multiple-party system, the two-party system greatly centralizes power within one 
majority group, and legislative proposals and decisions strongly reflect the ideology of the party 
that gains the greatest number of seats (Dahl 2002, 61). 
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The differences in political representation have also impacted non-governmental 
participation. On the surface, environmental NGOS have a much more visible and purposeful role 
in EU policymaking and, unlike the us, receive direct funding from the Environmental 
Commission (Grant, Matthews, and Newe112000, 51). Although this connection has given 
ENGOs a more legitimate role in EU policymaking, their influence is almost entirely confined to 
the problems and policy streams (Grant, Matthews, and Newe112000, 50). Similar to the us, 
powerful business interests still have greater access to heads of government and have more 
impact on policy decisions in the politics stream (Grant, Matthews, and Newe112000, 51) . 
. 
While the differences between the EU and us' political systems are not a direct cause of the 
divergence in climate change policy, they are useful in explaining why the EU has been able to 
achieve such great policy successes and why the environment continues to receive greater 
priority than it does in the us. Additionally, the comparatively more influential role that business 
interests play in both EU and us political systems helps illuminate the continued implementation 
failures in the EU and the difficulties associated with the creation of policy in the us. 
Economic Interests 
The central and important role that economic interests play in environmental policy in 
presents another collision between rhetoric and results, and serves as a strong explanatory factor 
for both the divergence in climate change policies and the continued struggle to either create. 
policy in the us or implement policy in the EU. 
Although the EU has the frE\11lework and political support to pursue its climate change goals, 
aggressive lobbying from industries and businesses at the state level has significantly hindered 
environmental progress at the supranational level (Bailey 2007,437). This problem is easily 
spotted again under the EU ETS, where member states continue to protect their key interests at the 
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expense of EU climate goals. In the first phase of EU ETS, only Germany and Slovenia did not 
allocate more pollution allowances than they actually emitted, while Finland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg and Slovakia each allocated allowances more than 25 per cent above recent 
emission calculations (Bailey 2007,436). 
The internal power struggles that continue to undermine the EU'S environmental progress are 
even more of an issue in the us because the us trails behind the EU so considerably in terms of 
policy creation and implementation. Similar to many industries in the EU, us businesses saw 
Kyoto not as an opportunity, but as a direct threat that would undermine their competitive 
advantage both domestically and abroad (Harrison 2007, 112). However, unlike the EU, the 
political stream in the us played a very crucial role in elevating and legitimizing skeptic claims 
and furthering industry interests. 
The cozy relationship between industrial interests and the political stream stemmed partly 
from President George w. Bush's personal ties with the Texas oil industry and Vice President 
Cheney'S time as CEO ofthe world's largest oil field support company (Harrison 2002, 104). 
These close links can be seen empirically through a rise in skeptic presence in the political arena. 
Heavy polluters such as the fossil fuel, aluminum and cement industries funded conservative 
think tanks which, in turn, published policy studies and policy analyses that were written 
primarily for policymakers (McCright and Dunlap 2000, 508). These policy studies, which were 
often written by lawyers, lobbyists, and consultants rather than scientists, sought to discredit 
scientific findings, frame climate change as liberal propaganda, and highlight the economic harm 
that would arise due to environmental regulation (McCright and Dunlap 2000,511). By injecting 
political ideological and rhetoric into the problem of climate change, skeptics and sympathetic 
politicians in the policy stream successfully politicized climate change (Ungar 1992,494), 
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causing a long and contentious debate that never occurred at such a high degree in the EU 
(Harrison 2007, 96). 
Public Attention and the Media 
Public attention and the media serve as important contributing factors in the different 
approaches to climate change, but unlike the other three arguments, they have played more of a 
facilitating role rather than a direct and causal one. The impact that public opinion had on 
climate change policy is not immediately clear because an overwhelming number of polls 
actually point to a high level of public concern for climate change in both the EU and us3• 
However, focusing solely on public opinion can be quite misleading. First, polls gauging public 
concern for climate change or support for government decisions imply that people are paying 
attention to policy decisions and understand the issues. Furthermore, public concern may appear 
substantial when presented alone, but in relation to other issues such as the economy, security, 
immigration, and health care, concern for climate change plummets.(Pew Research Center. 
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2007)4. Thus, although gauging the level of public concern for climate change can be useful, a 
more relevant question is the degree to which voters are actually paying attention to their 
governments' climate policies (Harrison and Sundstron 2007,6). 
Many public opinion polls in the us indicate widespread confusion concerning the Bush 
Administration's stance on Kyoto. A 2002 poll conducted by the Program on International Policy 
3 Brewer found that two-fifths of us respondents considered climate change to be a very serious problem and 
believed it is already having an effect, and 75% of respondents 'strongly favored' or 'somewhat favored' ratifying 
the Kyoto Protocol (Brewer 2003,151). A World Public Opinion poll found that 94% of Americans believe that the 
us should reduce emissions at least as much as other developed nations (WorldPublicOpinion 2005a). A Gallup poll 
found American support for the environment, even at the expense of economic growth, was highest between 1997 
(66%) and 2000 (70%), compared to 61 % in 1984 and 49% in 2008 (Gallup 2008) The Eurobarameter survey found 
that three-fourths of Europeans feel climate change is a 'very serious' problem' and 61 % reported having already 
taken 'some kind' of action (2008, 80). Reiner et al. found that over 90% of respondents in Sweden, us, UK, and 
Japan accepted that climate change was a problem, and over 80% believed they had a responsibility to look out for 
the interests of future generations, even if it made the current generation worse off (2006; 2097). . 
4 Among Republican respondents, climate change is rated as least important on a list of23. Among Democrat 
respondents, climate change is rated fifth least important on a list of23. And among Independents, climate change is 
rated third le.ast important on a list of23. . 
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Attitudes (PIPA) found that 48% ofrespondents incorrectly answered that Bush favored the 
Kyoto Protocol, and 42% said that he opposed it. Two years later, PIPA found that 42% ofthe 
American public still believed that Bush favored Kyoto, while 48% said that he opposed it. In 
2005, the same poll found that the public was still evenly divided with 43% saying he favored it, 
and 43% saying he opposed it (WorldPublicOpinion.org 2005b). Furthermore, in the wake of the 
us' decision to pullout of Kyoto, a 2002 Pew Research poll found that 44% of us respondents 
disapproved of Bush's decision, while 83% disapproved in Britain, 89% in Italy, 87% in 
Germany, and 85% in France (Pew Global 2001). 
Related to this lack of political awareness is the problem of social confusion-an issue that 
occurs in both the EU and us. Reiner et al. found that respondents in the UK, Sweden, and Japan 
correctly identified causes of climate change two to three times more often than us respondents 
(2006,2095). Results from a Eurobarameter survey show that Sweden, Norway, Finland, and the 
Netherlands feel best informed about causes and issues associated with climate change, with 
relatively strong feelings in the UK and Luxemburg. However, six in ten respondents in Romania, 
Portugal, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, and Turkey typify themselves as poorly informed on causes 
and ways of fighting climate change (Eurobarameter 2008). Using the data from the 
Eurobarameter, the European Parliament and the European Commission concluded first that 
although many Europeans are "highly concerned about climate change and willing to take action, 
there is a lack of knowledge and information about how to do it," and secondly that there are 
"Europeans who do not know what the European Union actually does to fight climate change" 
(2008). 
In the us, the striking degree of public confusion, and the widespread mystification 
concerning the causes of climate change led to a general state of inattention and bafflement. This 
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provided an opportunity for skeptics to influence climate change policy. Although 
misunderstanding and inattention existed in the EU, a more attentive public helped counteract the 
confusion and was more effective at monitoring government decisions.,This can be partially 
attributed to Europeans' worldviews towards the environment and their history of pollution. This 
living memory continues to shape perceptions towards the environment and, at a minimum, 
keeps environmental issues on the political agenda. 
The variation in public attention is inextricably linked to the differences in media coverage in 
the EU and us. Comparing climate change reports in the us and UK, Boykoff and Rajan found 
that the us media has been more critical of scientific claims, specifically that anthropogenic 
activities have resulted in elevated levels of greenhouse gases (2007, 208). In a content analysis 
from 1988 to 2002, Boykoff and Boykofffound that 53% of articles appearing in the New York 
Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and the Wall Street Journal gave equal attention to 
the claims put forth by climate skeptics and scientists, thereby presenting the two claims as 
equally legitimate and sound (2004, 131). Additionally, in a 2005 study, Carvalho found that the 
media's portrayal of climate change generally, but not always, correlated with the government's 
stance, subsequently fostering greater support for regulation in European media and more 
skepticism of climate change in us media (2005, 20). This tendency was highlighted in the 
European media's response to Bush's decision to withdraw from Kyoto. 'Liberal' and 
'conservative' newspapers throughout Europe heatedly echoed European leaders' critiCism of 
Bush's decision to abandon Kyoto. 
These content analysis studies point to a causal link between media coverage and public 
perception. While this relationship has proven quite detrimental to climate change efforts in the 
'us over the last decade, there is new evidence of a move towards more scientifically-sound 
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reporting. In a 2007 content analysis, Boykoff discovered an "evolutionary" shift in us media 
coverage of climate change, one that presents a more scientifically accurate account of climate 
change rather than a balanced and informationally-biased report (2007,6). The same study found 
that the UK media has consistently provided accurate climate change reports over the last decade 
that reflect scientific findings rather than social or political commentary (Boykoff 2007, 6). 
These findings indicate that climate change coverage in the us is beginning to resemble 
European, specifically UK reporting, by providing more accmate coverage. Additionally, these 
findings point to a change in national sentiment as climate change becomes more socially and 
politically salient. Stronger, more accurate coverage of climate change could act as a catalyst in a 
shift in national opinion and lend important support to federal climate change initiatives. 
THE FUTURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION: KINGDON'S POLICY WINDOW 
It is by now abundantly clear that a range of power mechanisms have greatly influenced the 
climate change agendas pursued by the EU and us and an array of cultmal, social, political, and 
economic factors have contributed to the divergence. However, this descriptive analysis stops 
short of any of prescriptive discussion concerning the futme of global climate change regulation. 
Given the monumental threat of climate change, it is important to understand how past 
developments continue to affect the futme of domestic and international mitigation efforts, and 
how certain events can render the us and the global community ripe for environmental change. 
In Kingdon's discussion of the policymaking process, he focuses on a critical juncture where 
the problems, policy, and politics streams merge to create a policy window in which a new 
political agenda emerges along with abundant but temporary opportunity for reform (Kingdon 
2003, 20). Kingdon explains that these windows are opened by the appearance of compelling 
problems known as focusing events or by changes in the political stream (Kingdon 2003, 20). 
30 
The recent election of Barack Obama ,as the next us president, the current economic crisis, the 
recent surge in gas prices, and past natural disasters provide ample analytical opportunity to 
discuss very real possibilities for a shift in us climate change policy. 
The biggest change that lends the significant support to the prospect of greater us 
participation has taken place in the politics stream. In November 2008, Obama strongly affirmed 
his administration's stance on climate change, declaring "now is the time to confront this 
challenge once and for all. Delay is no longer an option. Denial is no longer an acceptable 
response" (Broder 2008). Obama has made it clear that he not only seeks to re-engage the us 
with Kyoto talks (Dreyfuss 2008, 21-28), but that "a new chapter in America's leadership on 
climate change will strengthen our security and create millions of jobs" (Broder 2008). Obama 
has stated that his "number 1 priority" is to "turbocharge the economy" by building "a new 
alternative-energy economy" (Klein 2008). 
Obama's rhetoric directly links economic stability with a healthy, sustainable environment, 
which Kingdon calls a coupling event (2003, 201). Kingdon explains that when a pressing 
problem demands attention and a policy proposal is coupled to the problem as one of its solution, 
a policy window occurs and brings the new administration's initiatives and philosophies to the 
forefront (2003, 201). This new link between the environment and the economy, which 
coincidently resembles the European mentality (Avosetta Conference 2002,3), represents an 
important shift in us environmental economics, :;md demonstrates the Obama Administration's, 
long-term commitment to this issue. 
This major shift in the politics stream strongly indicates greater support for domestic and 
international climate change regulation. However, there have also been a handful offocusing 
events, which, as Kingdon explains, can also initiate the emergence of a policy window. The 
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spike in summer gas prices can be considered one of these focusing events. In June 2007, the 
national average price of gas was just under $3.10 per gallon. One year later, gas had increased 
more than a dollar to a national average of $4.12 per gallon (EIA 2008). Public discontent over 
the price of fuel soon made energy a salient issue in the summer presidential campaigns and 
quickly initiated a response from Democrats and Republicans in Congress (Johnson and Davey 
2008). While Senate Democrats sought to provide tax incentives for renewable energy sources 
(Andrews 2008), House Republicans pushed to relax restrictions on offshore drilling (Hulse, and 
Herszenhorn 2008). 
Although the responses from both Democrats and Republicans demonstrate the problem of 
pet solutions, where political players seek to use a shift in public mood to promote personal 
agendas (Kingdon 2003,203), there was a stronger undertone of urgency inside and outside of 
Washington. While some public outcry was appeased with a temporary but immediate drop in 
the price of gas, there was a general sense that society's dependence on foreign, non-renewable 
oil was both problematic and potentially detrimental. The public's demand for comprehensive 
change has put pressure on policymakers in the policy stream, which can potentially force 
Congress to work with Obama and develop a systematic change in energy policy. 
Additionally, the current financial crisis, which could temporarily postpone climate goals, 
also has the potential to initiate a fundamental shift in energy and environmental policy. The 
economic downturn has "hit Americans where it really hurts"-in basic expenses such as the 
daily commute, home heating, grocery bills, etc. (Goldman 2008). This has given the public the 
impression that the "system isn't working" (Leahy 2008), and, like the spike in gas prices, has 
increased public awareness and strengthened demand for a response from the federal 
government. As Anthony Leiserwitz, director of the Yale Project on Climate Change, explains, 
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"if the system is perceived to be broken, then people are more open to change things to make 
things better" (Leahy 2008). Leiserwitz believes that the current economic failures and recent 
energy crises can cause people to "open their eyes to the subtle and dramatic impacts of climate 
change," which "will become what is known as a focusing event. .. and result in huge societal 
shifts" (Leahy 2008). The volatility and uncertainty associated with the current financial 
situation can help solidify the public's demand for cheaper and sustainable sources of energy, 
and also lend important external support to the politics stream and ensure that Obama's climate 
change agenda is realized. 
'While the policy and politics streams have become thoroughly absorbed in these serious 
social, economic, and environmental concerns, grassroots efforts continue to grow and mobilize. 
This activism is aimed at capturing the attention of visible and non-visible participants in the 
p'olitics and policy streams and ensuring the passage of a climate change bill in Congress 
(Burdick 2009). February 2009 welcomed the largest youth-led climate change conference in 
Washington DC, with more than· 10,000 protestors marching to generate awareness and support 
for climate change legislation (Block 2009). While many of the marchers were students and 
concerned citizens, the event also attracted key political participants such as renowned scientist 
James Hansen, author Bill McKibben, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and other members of 
Congress (Block 2009). This success and unity has buttressed existing efforts within the problem 
stream to capture the attention of policymakers and has given climate change an important and 
stable foothold within the legislative process. The effects of this increased mobilization are 
starting to fructify with the recent unveiling of a draft climate change bill by House Democrats in 
March, 2009 (Broder 2009). This draft bill, which has yet to garner any Republican support; is . 
aimed at mitigating greenhouse gases and reducing the nation's dependence on oil. Although it is 
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in the preliminary stages, this new initiative leaves many questions unanswered, including how 
to distribute credits and how the revenue should be spent (Broder 2009). 
The spike in gas summer prices, the financial crisis, and the increasingly visible climate 
change movement have successfully engage all three policy streams. These focusing events, 
coupled with the shift in the politics stream lend significant support to the prospects of a policy 
window. However, there have also been several natural disasters that can be construed as 
focusing events, but they differ from economic events in significant ways. First, although 
environmental scares can and often do capture the attention of key participants in the problems 
and policy streams as well as community members in the impacted area, they do not generate 
widespread public concern in the same way as economic events. Principles of selection often 
diminish the opportunity for environmental events to remain in the public eye because the public 
loses attention after the event subsides. 
Another limiting aspect of environmental focusing events is that the link between a shift in 
weather patterns and climate change is not always made. For example, although climate change 
is not directly or solely responsible for fuel shortages, the spike in the price of gas painfully 
highlighted society's reliance on a non-renewable fuel source and elevated the public's interest 
in alternative fuel for the sake of their savings and economic well-being (Krauss 2008). The link 
between the economy and the environment has been strengthened by Obama's economic plan 
where he points to sustainability as an engine for economic recovery. This was not the case with 
Hurricane Katrina. While Katrina evoked concern, it exemplified what Hilgartner and Bosk call 
the "complex institutionalized system of problem formulation" (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 55). 
The environmental problems embedded in Katrina were not substantial enough to receive steady, 
consistent, and accurate media coverage, and were eventually dropped in favor of more exciting, 
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novel stories. This is not to say that natural disasters have no impact on the political agenda, but 
they often struggle to initiate concern and urgency beyond the problem stream. 
Taken together, Obama's stance on climate change, coupled with the public's discontent 
towards the price of fuel, and the uncertain economic conditions all point to a policy window in 
the near future. The three streams that Kingdon explains must converge in order to initiate a 
policy window are indeed coming together. The political stream and its visible participants such 
as Obama and Biden are pushing for a new climate change agenda, which has been the missing 
link in getting the us on board with Kyoto and GHG reductions. The problems stream has 
introduced serious focusing events that have ignited widespread concern and awareness, 
initiating a shift in public sentiment that not only accepts, but demands action from the federal 
government. Finally, visible and·non-visible participants in the policy stream have joined the 
growing grassroots efforts and have brought the issue of climate change into policy discussions. 
Taken together, the conditions have been met for a policy window to open in which the us is 
ready to initiate a new phase in domestic and global climate change policy. 
Although it is very likely that a policy window will initiate renewed us involvement in global, 
climate change initiatives, this also marks the start of an even greater problem. Similar to the 
difficulties facing the EU'S climate change goals, the us and the Obama Administration must 
reconcile what it pledges to do and what it can actually accomplish. Analyzing how the current 
economic crisis and other pertinent issues have impacted the EU'S progress towards its goals will 
help illuminate whether the pledge t6 ambitiously and proactively address climate change is 
merely rhetoric or whether this truly marks a fundamental shift in global climate change policy. 
At the Climate Change Summit in Brussels in October 2008, then EU president Nicolas 
Sarkozy refuted rumors that the EU would regress from its ambitious climate change goals, 
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declaring, "the climate package is so important that we cannot simply drop it under the pretext of 
a financial crisis" (ED 'Holds Firm' on Climate Goals 2008). At that same time, however, 
representatives from countries such as Greece, Portugal, Italy, and the former Soviet bloc (EU 
'Holds Firm' on Climate Goals 2008) as well as representatives from traditional environmental 
frontrunners such as Germany argued that their countries could not afford to enforce tough 
emissions targets on their key industrial sectors (Jacob 2008). 
Grant et al. explain that EU climate change policies face significant hurdles, especially when 
placed in the context of the current economic crisis, due to even greater resistance from member 
states, a possible shift in public support and priorities, and a volatile economic market (2000, 
10). They argue, "it is important to be aware of the limits of what could be achieved at a time of 
severe economic turbulence characterized by the phenomenon of 'stagflation,' defined as 
minimal growth and high inflation" (Grant, Matthews, Newell 2000, 10). Although the 
industrialized Eu-IS is currently on target to meet its collective goal of cutting ORO emissions by 
8 per cent for the 2008-2012 period, there is still the problem of sub-par performance from the 
less industrialized Eu-I2, who have projected emission increases for their 2006-2010 period 
(Eu-IS on Target ... 2008). 
This disconnected progress is further exacerbated by the current economic crisis. With the 
larger European economies, including Britain, France, Germany, and Spain already in a 
recession, and Central and Eastern Europe on the verge of a downward spiral as the flow of 
credit continues to dry up, these economic strains could very easily undermine the progress that 
has been made and further alienate the developing ED states from collective climate change goals 
(Schwartz 2009). Ultimately, short-term emission reductions during periods of economic 
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stability will mean very little if the broader trend is towards emission increases during periods of 
economic hardship. 
Although the prospects of continued EU leadership on climate change goals may not be as 
bright as they were at the height of environmental legislation in the 1970s, the EU has shaped its 
national and international identity around its commitment to the environment (Grant, Matthews, 
and Newell 2000, 53). This alone indicates that, although the EU'S goals and objectives may run 
up against significant hurdles, the EU is intent in maintaining its role as an international leader on 
environmental issues. Thus, while the policy window in the EU has grown smaller over time, 
environmental issues still remain an integral part of European culture and politics. Because of 
this, the EU'S climate change goals will continue to receive the necessary political support to 
solidify their place on the EU agenda, which also lends important legitimacy to climate change 
talks at the international level. 
CONCLUSION 
Kingdon's policy model sheds light on the significantly intricate and extremely malleable " 
way in which climate change policy has been created, shaped, altered, and implemented. This 
policy framework provides a better understanding of the prospects for future global climate 
change policy as well as the social, political, and economic hurdles that threaten to undermine' ',' 
and diminish its efficacy. However, while Kingdon's model helps clarify climate change as a 
policy issue, there is a deeper, more theoretical problem at the heart of climate change. Broadly 
speaking, climate change confronts the traditional way in which international problems are 
addressed. Conventional international problems are generally tangible conflicts such as trade 
disputes, territory issues, and'resource ownership that take place within state borders and are 
dealt with at the nation-state level (Weiss 1999,99). Climate change, however, confronts these 
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traditional notions by transcending fault, causality, responsibility, jurisdiction, and authority, and 
poses a direct threat to all. Thus, in order to truly analyze, understand, and address climate 
change, it may be necessary to alter the way the international community deals with international 
issues and ask whether or not the traditional political players, i.e. nation-states, governments, 
political parties, and policymakers can really be at the forefront of a successful solution. 
If truly effective approaches to climate change require fundamental structural changes in the 
way developed societies operate, it is hard to conceive that the traditional players who depend 
on those very social structures and institutions will initiate any sort of drastic change. For 
example, since transportation is one of the leading causes of global GHG emissions, a significant 
social, economic, and political shift in the way cars and planes are produced and used is required 
in order to reduce emissions. However, given the comparatively more powerful role of the road, 
oil, air traffic, and car industries, combined with social tendencies favoring private rather than 
public transportation, the likelihood of massive investments in public transportation, a swift 
shift towards smaller, fuel efficient cars, and widespread public acceptance is minimal at best. 
Using Foucault's idea of structural and social power, the traditional decision-making entities 
that would usually be at the forefront of policy creation and implementation are too strongly 
attached to the social, political, and economic structures that have acted as impediments to the 
problem of climate change and environmental issues for so long. As Hein-Anton VanDer Heijden 
explains, "the tried-and-true tested ways of dealing with climate change will be exhausted soon. 
Political parties have lost their credibility, and environmental and social movements seem to be 
the only social actors representing the widespread fear ofthe public" (2008, 62). 
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Although the traditional political and economic players will most likely continue to be at the 
forefront of climate change decisions, many scholars have posited normative visions for the way 
climate change policy should be approached. Jurgen Trittin believes that the role of the nation-
state is gradually declining in primacy as powerful non-state actors such as NGOS and 
multinational corporations (MNCS) exert their presence in the international arena (200428). He 
argues that in the case of climate change, "nation-states must recognize that their importance as a 
source of national identity is coming to an end. They must even advance this on-going process 
I 
constructively to save our planet ... we need people who think globally and people with a sense 
of global responsibility" (2004, 27). 
Der Heiden echoes this sentiment by pointing out that the global community and nation-
state~ have reacted to climate change by creating a weak global environmental regime. He 
envisions truly effective climate change policy stemming from a "transnational civic 
environmental movement" that can "take over the roles and functions that were formerly 
performed by political parties" (2008, 61). Additionally, the prevailing methods of mitigating 
climate change, which take root in traditional capitalist theory, presents a significant challenge to 
the conventional role of the nation-state. As Bailey explains, on one hand, effective international 
carbon trading requires nation-states to accede to a higher regulatory authority and, at the same 
time, places a significant level of trust in the private sector with the nation-states assuming a role 
of market manager (2007, 431). Thus, if prospects for a global carbon market are to be realized, 
the nation-state could conceivably be forced to take a significant step back from its traditionally 
central role. 
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Although these normative visions are only guiding principles and conceptualizations of the 
best approach to climate change, they offer considerable insight into the future of global climate 
change regulation. Given that climate change issues will continue to hinder, limit, and shape the 
course oflocal, national, and international growth. it is important to understand both the ideal and 
realistic opportunities to address this issue. Although the construction and implementation of 
climate change policy is central to this broad problem, looking beyond basic policy and power 
issues and questioning the prevailing methods of international problem solving will be 
instrumental in shaping the future of international discourse and decisions concerning climate 
change. 
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